1. Background
One of the longer-lasting disputes of modern political history, there have been numerous peace proposals over the years. This 'framework' draws unashamedly from some of those past proposals, in particular those which have come closest to achieving peace between Israel and a proposed future Palestinian State, most notably the Camp David Summit of July, 2000 and the Taba Summit seven months later.
Some guidance has also been gained from past independent initiatives, such as the Geneva Initiative and Lieberman Plan (in many ways polar opposites), but the main framework has been built on Camp David and Taba. The areas where these were successful in achieving accord will not be re-examined here, but keen focus will be on the key areas where accord failed, in particular that of Palestinian statehood and right of return.
This will also be titled a 'framework' document rather than proposal, to make it clear that it is just that, a 'framework' to be built upon and shaped and modelled further by interested parties on both sides.
2. Core framework
Apart from failure to agree on the right of return being cited as one of the main reasons for the failure to reach agreement at Camp David and Taba, an increasing concern since then has been the rising number of settlers in the West Bank, and that this might therefore impede future peace by creating a 'facts on the ground' situation which would make the final drawing of a border close to the '67 lines difficult if not impossible; a factor mentioned only recently by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, in Middle East resolution discussions.
This proposal would seek to address both of these key issues in a way that would not only facilitate effective resolution, in effect cancelling each other out, but would allow both issues to be looked upon in a far more positive light not only by both involved parties, Israelis and Palestinians, but by the world outside. In essence what has so far been viewed as an impasse between the two parties could be turned around to create the basis of more harmony and accord between them.
To this effect, where this proposal differs radically from past proposals is that the settlers would be allowed to stay - as long as double that number of Palestinians were allowed right of return (split between 'permanent residency' in Israel and citizenship within the newly formed Palestinian State). Both parties would continue to vote for their national elections (Palestinians for Palestinian elections and Israeli settlers for Israeli), but their vote would count in the local elections of where they lived.
This then would bypass the problem Israel has historically had of allowing right of return within Israel because it might sway voting in the Knesset towards an Islamic leaning radical-style government. But in essence a Palestinian's main interests should be in their nation's ruling party in Palestine and likewise an Israeli's in Israel. Neither side should have interest in trying to influence the other's ruling government.
The numbers that would return either to Israel itself (within close to the subsequently drawn '67 borders) or beyond to the West Bank would be a matter to be determined and negotiated between the parties. But as as an initial guideline the number allowed within Israel itself should aim to be within 20%, plus or minus, the number of Jewish settlers remaining the Palestinian side of the border; so it was seen that there was some reasonable 'reciprocation' between the two. The remainder then would be settled in the West Bank. This total figure between Israel and the West Bank, based on the estimated number of settlers, would be 1,000,000-1,100,000 Palestinians.
The rate of such an influx of people would have to be carefully monitored and managed to ensure reasonable integration and decent housing and social conditions, so the suggested rate at which this should take place would follow the guidelines established by Madeleine Albright at Camp David of 150,000 people per annum.
Since the number of Palestinians originally displaced is estimated at 720,000, a right of return and reintegration of some 1,050,000 would seem just and fair (45% more than originally displaced). However, if - after a period of establishment of the Palestinian State and successful reintegration of the original quotas of Palestinians and peaceful and stable relationships between Israel and the newly formed Palestinian State over that period (for sake of example, seven years) - the Palestinian State wished the return and reintegration of further Palestinians, then the issue could be re-examined; since in effect by then such absorption would be a predominantly Palestinian State issue. But the numbers returning to Israel itself would be capped at point of the original agreement.
3. Benefits to both sides
The increase in West Bank settlers over the past twenty years has been viewed by the Palestinian side as one of the biggest impediments to peace. Similarly, right of return has been viewed as a prime obstacle by Israel. By linking these two factors to advantage, this then allows Palestinians to view the issue of settlements in a far more benign light, in particular because it will have been pivotal to their right of return, something sought from the onset of the conflict.
If the initial aim of the settlers was to create 'facts on the ground' to impede peace and a workable two-state solution, then it would be seen that they had failed in this endeavour; in particular because there is no legal framework by which simply because one party occupies another's land it automatically becomes theirs.
But the main advantage to Israel is that there would be no need to dismantle settlements and move settlers to other areas and a possible repeat of the fraught scenes witnessed when the IDF helped remove settlers from Gaza. Nor a requirement to swap other land in compensation, since the absorption of a large number of Palestinians to match and exceed the quota of settlers over the border would be seen as the 'trade off' (as obviously land would need to be designated to absorb those Palestinian returnees). As a result, the border division could be made swiftly; though there would obviously be required changes in security arrangements for this over-border zone, addressed in point 5.
4. Aid and reciprocation
There would be an accompanying substantial aid package for the reintegration of Palestinians both to Israel and the West Bank to provide decent housing and adequate social and work conditions. The figure suggested for this at Camp David in 2000 was $30 billion, though this might now need re-evaluating.
When in the past the subject of Palestinian right of return has been discussed, Israel has also raised the issue of the many Jews who either left or were expelled from Arab nations in the years after 1948, with their land and property also lost. Rather than some reciprocal compensation on each side, perhaps these nations could be prime partners with Israel (and other leading nations and funds) in financing the resettling of Palestinians in Israel and the West Bank.
It would be pointless though to solve the Palestinian refugee problem as it relates to Israel and the West Bank without also addressing it in other Arab nations, so this same system of comparable decent housing and 'residency' conditions should also apply in these regions. In other words, no refugee camps and decent housing replacing all, with the Palestinians having the choice of where to live. Either where they were now or returning to regions of the West Bank and Israel.
However, the same system of 'residency' might also be ideal in these instances. Lebanon in particular has voiced in the past that the absorption of Palestinians as citizens would unbalance the delicate religious-aligned demographics of their nation, and the same situation exists in some other Arab nations to a lesser extent. 'Permanent residency' for Palestinians would therefore provide the ideal solution; it should also not be viewed as diminishing their rights in any sense, as they would have the same rights as any citizens, except on the issue of national elections. In this regard their vote would count in Palestinian elections, as obviously they cannot vote in the national elections of two governments.
In the context of Israel, the same would apply, and indeed returning Palestinians would be little different to the Palestinians offered Israeli citizenship after 1967, yet a number declined it on the basis that it might be seen they were 'legitimizing' the State of Israel. They were offered instead 'Permanent residency', which they accepted.
In turn Israeli settlers the other side of the newly drawn Palestinian border would vote in Israeli elections yet be 'resident' in Palestine, with some economic benefits also derived from their presence there. Furthermore, this reciprocation of residency makes perfect sense in light of the fact that 21% of Israel's current populous are Arab; indeed, the insistence that every Israeli Jew should be expelled to the Israeli side before peace can be agreed might be viewed as equally apartheid as the suggestion the other way that every returning Palestinian shall remain their side. This 'reciprocal integration', along with the avoidance of the disruption of a large mass of people before the border can be defined, therefore offers a far faster route to reconciliation and peace.
5. Economics and security
Aside from political initiative and goodwill on both sides, two crucial elements which will make such a plan work in practice are economics and security. In addition to the aforementioned sizeable contribution to provide decent housing and conditions, work infra-structure will be a vital factor.
More projects along the lines of the Valley of Peace Initiative should therefore be put in place; a joint co-operation project between Israel, Jordan and West Bank Palestinians, Israel's Economic Minister Natfali Bennett reports that the area has over 50 factories where Jews and Palestinians work successfully together. This role model could be expanded, and of course with recognized peace between the two parties there should be no lack of willing foreign investment from Gulf Arab states and the international community. With peace will also come increased tourism for both parties and related income.
While the cost of re-housing such a large number of Palestinians in Israel and the West Bank is substantial, it should be remembered that a large part of this funding will come from outside and will during that process generate strong activity in the building industry, with numerous Israelis and Palestinians involved in the building process and a wide range of companies involved in the supply of building materials, fixtures and furnishings. This activity in itself will create something of an economic boom.
Adequate housing for young Israelis and families has also been an issue raised increasingly in Israel, so perhaps this programme could also be partly designated to alleviate that problem with 20% of all these new building programmes within Israel earmarked for Israeli-Jewish inhabitants, along the lines of 'social housing' models adopted in many European nations (thus at reduced cost and with special incentives for first time buyers, essential workers and families in need). Improved road and water supply infra-structures for these new communities will generate further economic activity and jobs.
Because a number of Israelis would be remaining the Palestinian side of the border drawn, by necessity many security arrangements would need to remain in place, at least for a 'transition period'. However, there should be a move away from what is seen as an 'occupying force' by one side and a 'necessary stringent security force' by the other.
The suggestion would therefore be for a new combined force of Israelis and Palestinians working side by side to ensure security. A 'Peace Cooperation Force' is one provisional name. This is not too far removed from the current situation where there is regular dialogue between Israel's security services and the PA's own security forces in the West Bank. This combined force would be responsible for all border security and in areas of high security necessity, such as areas where settlers remain in the new Palestinian territory.
Again the creation of such a force moves away from a 'them and us' situation and helps forge better integration and harmony; not least because at that point the shared interest in maintaining security, for the continued well-being of Israelis and Palestinians alike, will be keener than ever before. It also then immediately removes the tag of an 'occupation force', because this will be seen as a collaborative effort with Israelis and Palestinians working side by side. There would also be an extended benefit in creating such a combined force and the way in which it would address possible future threats, as detailed in point 7.
6. Political will and implementation
Though the initial implementation of such a plan could commence quickly, the implementation of all its stages with 150,000 Palestinians per year being absorbed and re-settled would take 6-8 years. A project worth referencing here because of its political time-scale sensitivity is nuclear fusion, one instance where Europe will lead the USA simply because of the time-scale of the project, 30 years. It was considered that with the enormous funding required, it would be difficult to guarantee that successive US administrations would be willing to continue approving its funding; whereas in Europe the project is led by non-political functionaries.
Very much the same applies here. Also we have the lessons that past peace initiatives have shown us. At Taba in 2001, Ehud Barak reported that if he'd had a few more months in office, he'd have been able to conclude talks and reach a resolution. Then the tragic example of Yitzhak Rabin, where peace hopes were shattered by a lone extremist gunman.
In short, the issue of long-term peace is too vital (and controversial) to both the Israeli and Palestinian people for any one political party or Prime Minister to take sole responsibility. The suggestion would therefore be for all parties to convene and agree, then a working committee established representing all Israeli parties concerned to roll the plan forward. This would then bypass any and all political sensitivity of changing parties which might scuttle the process, and would also remove blame from any one party or individual.
The same would apply to the Palestinian side. The main political parties Fatah and Hamas would need to agree on the plan, then appoint a joint working committee to implement it alongside the Israeli 'peace plan' committee.
7. The new Palestinian State
The obstacles and challenges that such a fledgling state would face should not be underestimated. However, hopefully the close working associations forged over the past decade between the PA and Israel's own security services will aid that process, with further transitional aid and progress through joint security forces such as the proposed PCF (Peace Cooperation force). And indeed economic and work initiatives with more 'Valley of Peace' style projects and increased tourism.
But the creation of the PCF and joint security initiatives between Israel and the new Palestinian State could have extended benefits for Palestine's overall security. In a recent TV interview, leader of the opposition Isaac Herzog commented that the new threat of the region was extremist groups threatening the security of more moderate nations, which has come to the fore all the more with the threat of IS and its territorial expansion.
Also in the wake of the Arab Spring, we have seen political turmoil in Syria, Libya and Egypt. This raises not only the factor that there are fewer surrounding Arab nations to serve as ideal role models for the new Palestinian state, but that such a fledgling state might be seen as an opportunity by extreme groups to try and usurp power. In either case, a strong security partner would be needed, however ironic it might be that such a partner would be Israel.
8. Background rhetoric and blame 'acceptance'
There has over the past years been an increasingly lamentable rhetoric with terms such as 'apartheid' and 'occupation' used with abandon (in the view of many, incorrectly). However, the move towards such a peace plan, with its integration of both Palestinian and Israeli-Jewish citizens on both sides of the divide - along with a joint collaboration security force replacing Israeli soldiers - should immediately quell such terms. In this new situation, they would not be seen as appropriate definitions by any yardstick.
But the other factor which has impeded peace over the years has been the inclination for one party to blame the other either mostly or wholly. It is therefore necessary for both parties (and those outside observing the conflict) to accept that there has been blame on both sides and cast aside what has so far been a 'footballer supporter' mentality when debating this conflict; not only because such a stance is factually flawed, but because it works directly against any peace hopes and initiatives.
While it is true that stringent security divides remain in place, restricting freedom of movement for Palestinians, it is also true that before the waves of suicide bombings 12-15 years ago the society was more open and the divides were not there. There has throughout this conflict been an extension of Newton's 'Third law of motion' at play – that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction – which needs to be recognized by both sides in order to learn from that history and move forward.
Both parties therefore need to accept that there have been faults, omissions and atrocities on both sides - and embrace and accept blame for those - yet with the firm conviction now not to repeat them in the future.
9. Crime and application of law
For minor crimes, each resident body – Palestinians in Israel and Israelis in Palestine – would usually be dealt with in the nations of residence by local criminal courts. However, in serious cases or where it was considered the punishment might be more extreme than in their nation of citizenship, extradition would be applied for and normally granted.
There would have to be correlation between the courts in Palestine and Israel on certain crimes, but particularly acts of terrorism; and where there remained any doubt, then joint courts would be established. The reason for this is that at this stage acts of terror would be seen as an attack on both States, since the principles of both States would be closely aligned and have a joint goal: peace, stability, security and prosperity for all its inhabitants, Palestinian and Israeli.
Gone therefore would be the dark days of the past where suicide bombers were rewarded and glorified on street posters, or extreme Jewish groups were let off lightly for their actions (the attempt on the Dome of the Rock is one such example). Cross border rocket and mortar attacks would also be dealt with severely by the PCF and these courts. In short, there would no longer be a 'them and us' mentality.
10. Geography and priority of entry
Suggested geographical formulas for Palestinian returnees are to extend areas which already have significant Arab communities or build fresh communities adjacent or near to these; or to create entirely fresh communities adjacent to the proposed 'corridor' linking Gaza and Hebron.
This corridor might also be an ideal location for fresh light industrial zone activity, along the lines of the Valley of Peace initiative in the West Bank.
Priority of entry to Israel for Palestinian returnees would be given to those who already have close ties or family in the area, or their family had past property there. Also those who it was considered were under political threat in their current nations of residence.
In part linked to point 9, 'Crime and application of law', prime consideration should also be given to those Palestinians who felt they might be unevenly treated in a new Palestinian state: minority groups, gays, and women of a certain persuasion (women's rights activists, for example).
Though of course an overriding factor in all of these considerations would be those who would not pose a threat to internal security.
11. Residential exchange flexibility and possible 'Peace camp' involvement
A crucial question here would be if 1,650,000 Arabs can live in peace in Israel, can 500,000-550,000 Israeli Jews do the same in Palestine? Given that the settlers presence would have facilitated right of return for so many Palestinians, allowing them to be viewed in a far more benign light, most Palestinians would probably answer, yes.
But given that a number of settlers have historically represented the more extreme elements, some Palestinians might still baulk at their presence; and those settlers, as the reverse side of that same coin, might not feel fully comfortable staying the Palestinian side of the border.
In these instances, one suggestion would be for exchanges of property to be arranged with Israeli Peace Camp members, who would normally feel far more comfortable with such a move, especially given the new light of what that 'exchange of residency' had come to represent. A hope for peace for all. Some financial incentive might also have to ride alongside such an 'exchange package', say 20% of the property's value, but still far less than the cost of demolishing property and relocating entire communities.
12. Flexibility in final Israeli-settler and Palestinian-resident figures
Finally there should be flexibility in the number of Palestinian returnees absorbed within Israel, guided by three key factors: the number of Israeli settlers remaining the Palestinian side might naturally reduce of its own volition prior to the border being drawn; the number of Palestinians that Israel felt it could realistically absorb, even on a 'permanent residency' basis; and finally the fact that a far higher proportion of Palestinians might wish to settle in the West Bank rather than Israel (indeed the Palestinian negotiating team at Camp David in 2000 indicated this would generally be the favoured option).
These three combined factors could reduce that final Palestinian 'residency in Israel' figure to within the range of 300,000 – 375,000 people. Though incumbent with this, the number of Palestinians settling in the West Bank should then proportionately increase so that the same overall approximate targets were met.
13. Overall aims and objectives
This 'framework' peace plan would completely about-turn the way settlers and settlement-activity are currently viewed: from being seen as an an arch impediment to peace to facilitating peace, along with allowing a working plan for partial Palestinian right of return.
It would create an additional living and working community of Israelis side by side with Palestinians to help forge better understanding between the two parties and generally move away from the past 'them and us' situation, which has generally increased suspicion, misunderstandings and hostilities.
14. Other key issues
As initially outlined, this 'framework' proposal focuses mainly on two key issues which have caused the failure of past peace initiatives: right of return and settlers/land swaps. In essence coming up with a radical formula not tabled in any past peace proposals and combining these to advantage; then dealing point by point with connected issues which might resultantly arise.
Other past key issues have been that of Jerusalem, but since agreement on that issue was close at Taba – in essence an open city with Palestinian sovereignty over Arab neighbourhoods and Israeli sovereignty over Jewish neighbourhoods, with Yerushalaim as the Capital of Israel and Al-Quds the Capital of Palestine - there would be little need for further comment here.
Or indeed additional deliberation on other issues, levels of military, connectivity from Gaza to Hebron, water and civil aviation rights - which had already been agreed in principal at Camp David and Taba
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